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THE PRIMACY OF CRIMINAL
PROSECUTION 
The British Government might assert that the primacy
of criminal prosecution has been assured ever since the
Diplock Report (Report of the Commission to consider
legal procedures to deal with terrorist activities in
Northern Ireland (Cmnd 5185, London, 1972)) plotted a
path out of internment without trial and military
predominance in Northern Ireland. But what happened
between 2001 and 2005 appeared to be a swing away from
prosecution. Detention without trial re-appeared under
the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001,
succeeded by control orders under the Prevention of
Terrorism Act 2005. The London bombings of July 7,
2005, aggravated this hostility to criminal justice, and Tony
Blair’s warning that “the rules of the game are changing”
certainly attained some traction against foreign suspects
(see Walker, C, “The treatment of foreign terror suspects”,
(2007) 70 Modern Law Review 427). However, the
paradoxical development on the domestic front, which has
grown in importance because of the trend of “neighbour
terrorism” (Walker, C, “‘Know thine enemy as thyself ’”:
Discerning friend from foe under anti-terrorism laws”
(2008) 32 Melbourne Law Review 275) – the recognition that
most terrorists are British citizen neighbours not aliens –
is a reversion to criminal prosecution.
This domestic trend may be evidenced by three
indicators. One is that both recent pieces of anti-terrorism
legislation have avoided reliance upon executive measures
(see Walker, C, The Anti-Terrorism Legislation (2nd ed,
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009). The break can be
seen starkly in the Terrorism Act 2006, which concentrates
on the delivery of new offences, such as incitement of
terrorism, or new police powers to investigate potential
crimes, notably, 28 day detention. Within the Counter-
Terrorism Act 2008, its administrative innovations of
notification and foreign travel restriction in Part IV are
dependent upon criminal convictions, while Part III
enhances sentencing powers. 
The second indicator is the paucity of executive orders.
Despite the apocalyptic analysis in 2007 of Jonathan Evans,
the Director of the Security Service, that 2,000 suspects
pose a threat to national security, there were just 15
control orders in force at the end of 2008. This absence of
custom is not for a want of customers but because these
executive measures are neither cost effective nor legally
certain compared to criminal prosecution.
The third indicator is a statistical re-gathering of pace
for criminal prosecution (Source: Home Office, Statistics
on Terrorism Arrests and Outcomes Great Britain
September 11, 2001 to March 31, 2008 (04/09, Home
Office, London, 2009).
In summary, criminal prosecution seems to have been
given a boost after 2005. But is criminal prosecution
preferable to executive measures? From a normative
standpoint, criminal prosecution prizes individual
responsibility through the notion of mens rea whereas risk to
public or state security predominates in executive measures.
The individuation of crime might thus be esteemed as an
affirmation of the value of human autonomy and equality.
There are also gains for system legality. There is affirmation
in more open fashion than is possible for executive measures
of public accountability and due process. 
Yet, there are downsides, the most basic of which is the
inability to incapacitate before a terrorism event. As the 21
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Director of the Security Service, Dame Eliza Manningham-
Buller, commented in 2005: “We may be confident that an
individual or group is planning an attack but that
confidence comes from the sort of intelligence I described
earlier, patchy and fragmentary and uncertain, to be
interpreted and assessed. All too often it falls short of
evidence to support criminal charges to bring an individual
before the courts, the best solution if achievable.”
(http://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/director-generals-speech-
to-the-aivd-2005.html) The next inherent problem with
criminal proof arises from the disclosure of secret sources,
techniques and data. The final drawbacks relate to
collective rather than individual impacts. There might arise
the troubling collective perception of the courts protecting
the state and not victims or the appearance of judges being
co-opted into the work of the executive, resulting in
damage to their reputation. The danger is that minority
communities, upon whom the anti-legislation unevenly
impacts, will feel distrust leading to lessening cooperation
(see House of Commons Home Affairs Committee,
Terrorism and Community Relations (2003-04 HC 165)).
THE PROBLEMS FACED IN CRIMINAL
PROSECUTION
Whilst a priority for criminal prosecution is warranted,
its implementation incurs attendant costs both for
substantive criminal offences and for criminal process.
Substantive criminal offences
The design of criminal offences within anti-terrorism
legislation evinces signs of several disturbing trends which
relate to their adaptation to the precautionary dynamic
described earlier. Three problems might be isolated: net-
widening through definitional construction based on reliance
on the term ‘terrorism’ and jurisdictional extensions to
foreign activities; guilt by association through membership
offences; and reverse burdens of proof in precursor criminal
offences. Have these threats been overcome?
Two principal responses have been made to the problem
of net-widening. The most potent is a welcome degree of
reticence on the part of the police. Of course, it is possible
to encounter instances of excess, such as the detention of
Walter Wolfgang at the Labour Party conference in 2005.
Nevertheless, indulgence continues to be shown to the
PKK, Hamas, and even to recent Tamil demonstrators. The
next response has been to impose the filter of consent by a
Law Officer for prosecution for many of the offences under
the anti-terrorism legislation, (Terrorism Act 2000, s 117;
Terrorism Act 2006, s 37; Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, s
29), though this filter does not reverse the chilling effect. 
Guilt by association through membership offences
under Part II of the Terrorism Act 2000 is the next
problem engendered by the prosecution of terrorism. As
operated in Britain at least, the main answer to the danger
of guilt by association has been a very low rate of
prosecutions: 55 charges between 2001 and 2007
(compared to 83 in Northern Ireland). Consequently, the
membership offence serves primarily the purpose of
symbolic denunciation. 
The third issue which has tainted criminal law concerns
the use of reverse burdens in special precursor offences.
The problem is relevant to membership offences just
described, but it has become acute and recurrent in
connection with offences of possession contrary to
sections 57 (possession of articles relevant to terrorism),
and 58 (possession of records relevant to terrorism) of the
Terrorism Act 2000. 
The responses by the courts to these features has been
complex and, for a long time, unconvincing. As regards
membership, a defence is provided in section 11(2) if it
can be shown that membership has lapsed since the date of
proscription. In Sheldrake v Director of Public Prosecutions;
Attorney General’s Reference (No 4 of 2002) [2004] UKHL 43,
Lord Bingham set out the important parameter that
“Security concerns do not absolve member states from
their duty to observe basic standards of fairness.” His
conclusion was that section 11(1) created a real risk that
blameless conduct could be penalised, so section 11(2)
should be read as involving only an “evidential burden.”
Date Arrest Charges Convictions Other action
Arrest – Release Terror Other Total (% Terror Other Total (% Total (%
total without offence crimes of arrest) offence crime of charge) of arrest)
charge
2001/2 108 58 22 16 38 (35%) 6 6 12 (32%) 13 (12%)
2002/3 275 141 64 30 94 (34%) 9 25 34 (36%) 39 (14%)
2003/4 191 81 52 38 90 (47%) 6 15 21 (23%) 21 (11%)
2004/5 168 109 35 12 47 (28%) 2 16 18 (38%) 13   (8%)
2005/6 285 193 50 25 75 (26%) 24 14 38 (51%) 16   (6%)
2006/7 213 101 81 22 103 (48%) 33 12 45 (44%) 10   (5%)
2007/8 231 136 55 19 74 (32%) 22 6 28 (38%) 19   (8%)
Total 1471 819 359 162 521 (35%) 102 94 196 (38%) 131   (9%)
This categorisation first arose in R v Director of Public
Prosecutions, ex parte Kebilene ([2000] 2 AC 326), where Lord
Hope applied the concept to the forerunner to section 57,
a finding underlined by section 118 of the Terrorism Act
2000. 
There are a number of other disputes about the fairness
of sections 57 and 58. One concerns the boundaries (as
distinct from who bears the burden of proof) of innocent
or reasonable possession which is a defence under section
57(2) and 58(3). This point was examined regarding
foreign policy in R v F [2007] EWCA Crim 243, where the
fact that the terrorism material was possessed with a view
to action against an odious foreign government (Libya) was
not a reasonable excuse. In R v G [2009] UKHL 13, the
House of Lords emphasised that the excuse must be
reasonable under section 58, based on the intrinsic nature
of the information. Though this prevents prosecutions
based on speculation about the possession of an A-Z of
London (an example given in K v R [2008] EWCA Crim
185, it also handicaps the defence by excluding
consideration of wider circumstances or purposes or even
mental illness. Under section 57(2), the focus is the
purpose of the defendant without reference to its
reasonableness. However, the courts have stopped a trend
whereby sections 57 and 58 were becoming akin to
offences of the possession of terrorism fantasy
pornography. According to R v Zafar [2008] EWCA Crim
184, there must be proven “a direct connection between
the objects possessed and the acts of terrorism. The
section should be interpreted as if it reads … he intends it
to be used for the purpose …” The same point was
underlined in R v Samina Malik [2008] EWCA Crim 1450,
where the “Lyrical Terrorist” was initially convicted under
section 58, not for her crass poetry such as “How to
Behead”, but for her possession of propagandist and
military documents. She was acquitted on appeal on the
grounds that the judge’s summing up had failed to isolate
those documents capable of founding a conviction under
section 58 by satisfying the test of inherent practical utility.
In summary, when the prosecution can assert without
ridicule that the London A-Z is a terrorist document, it is
indeed time to slam on the judicial brakes. The brakes have
been duly applied in some respects, but the offences are far
from ‘almost redundant’ (Tadros, V, “Crime and security”,
(2008) 71 Modern Law Review 940 at p 968) and remain top
of the list for charges (32% of terrorist offences charges are
under s 57). 
Given the manifold expansions of the criminal law by the
Terrorism Acts 2000 and 2006, meagre scope remains for
a general offence of terrorism. The only conceivable uses it
could serve are jurisdictional – for example, to prosecute
the attackers of the hotels in Mumbai or on the Sri Lankan
cricket team in Pakistan, assuming some of the foreign
perpetrators are ever found within the United Kingdom
jurisdictions. Yet, a universal offence of terrorism lacks
justification in international law, which might hamper
cooperation and create conflicting jurisdictions. In
addition, the costs of criminal process and imprisonment
come into play when the role of world prosecutor is
assumed. 
Criminal process
The enduring pressures of coping with terrorism upon
traditional criminal justice process are illustrated by the
juryless Diplock courts in Northern Ireland, which have
been accorded a new lease of life by the Justice and
Security (Northern Ireland) Act 2007. Juries largely
survive in Britain, aside from the isolated case of the
special non-jury Scottish trial (in the Netherlands) of those
accused of the Lockerbie bombing, and with the exception
in place for jury tampering under the Criminal Justice Act
2003. Further incursions into jury trial have been mooted
for coroners’ inquests, an idea which pointedly first
appeared in the Counter-Terrorism Bill 2007-08, Part VI,
but was then finally defeated in the context of the Coroners
and Justice Bill 2008-09, clause 11. 
Some changes to criminal justice processes have
occurred. Section 16 of the Terrorism Act 2006 ensures
that preparatory hearings are mandatory in terrorism
cases. The objective is to ensure that there is in every case
enhanced judicial management of terrorism indictments.
This change has been followed up with tighter
management of terrorist cases through the Protocol on the
Management of Terrorism Cases issued by the President of
the Queen’s Bench Division (2nd ed, Courts Service,
London, 2007). The Protocol ensures that all indictable
only ‘terrorism case’ will be managed  via the ‘terrorism
cases list’ by the Presiding Judges of the South Eastern
Circuit and other nominated judges of the High Court and
tried by a nominated judge of the High Court. This
attention to detail and the imposition of senior judicial
active involvement is generally to be welcomed. But it
potentially dilutes the principle of trial by peers and could
threaten further if concerns about cost and delay become
overweening, as was alleged in R v Khyam [2008] EWCA
Crim 1612, where judges appeared so concerned about
delays and costs that that they were asked to recuse
themselves. It could also be perceived as creating too cosy
a relationship between judges and prosecutors, an
accusation levelled against the 14th Section of the Paris
Court System.  
Next, there are pressures on the equality of arms
through a lack of defence resources, for example, to be
funded for, and be able to find, experts to match those of
the police. In addition, the high security conditions
imposed upon the defendants may also affect their ability
to give effective instructions. The defence also face the
danger of media prejudice, which is encouraged by
extravagant talk from police and politicians.
One might predict further criminal justice proliferation
of special advocates, 50 of whom who perform a role 23
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which is depicted as a key safeguard for the controlled
person under paragraph 7 of the Schedule to the
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. Lord Carlile has
expressed approbation even to the extent of requiring
them to override expressed wishes of the suspect. By
contrast, Lord Steyn in R v Roberts said that ‘the special
advocate procedure undermines the very essence of
elementary justice’ [2005] UKHL 45 (at para 88). Their
ability to serve the interests of justice certainly requires
further support.
Moving from mode of trial and trial processes to
evidential features, the rules of evidence have not been
altered substantially in recent British terrorism
prosecutions, in contrast to past experience in Northern
Ireland. Critics might argue that the damage has already
been done and that changes to the right to silence and
hearsay have been sustained in ‘normal’ law. Problems with
admission and disclosure have, however, arisen. The
suppression of evidence through public interest immunity
claims have been handled tolerably well, with the exception
that it is envisaged that the future admissibility of intercept
data as evidence pursuant to the Chilcot Report requires
special rules to nullify any “quixotic” judge who creates a
“material risk” to security (Privy Council Review of
intercept as evidence: report to the Prime Minister and the
Home Secretary (Cm 7324, London, 2008)). There
remain dire warnings about the expense and practicability
of the process, even though intercept data is often crucial
evidence in terrorism prosecutions elsewhere. May be a
leaf could be taken out of the Classified Information
Procedures Act of 1980 in the USA, which managed to
answer a variety of serious challenges in US v Moussaoui
(382 F.3d 453 (2004, cert den 161 L. Ed. 2d 496, 2005))
consistent with Sixth Amendment rights. 
The other aspect of evidence which causes discomfort in
terrorism cases concerns the admissibility of evidence
obtained from torture. The rejection of such evidence was
firm enough in A v Secretary of State for the Home Department
(No 2) [2005] UKHL 71. But the judgment can rightly be
condemned as insufficiently demanding of state authorities
and too demanding of the appellant. Its emphasis upon
torture belies an indulgence towards inhuman and
degrading treatment, thereby ignoring the evil design of
regimes such as Guantánamo. The issue of torture has been
encountered in two recent terrorist trials in England
(Salahuddin Amin in R v Khyam [2008] EWCA Crim 1612
and Rangzieb Ahmed in 2008). They illustrate that the
court are ready to reject as an abuse of process any
evidence which can be said to be a direct product of
torture. However, the courts should more carefully test
whether a continuum can be established in joint operations
with foreign states (notably Pakistan) and whether
collaboration has arisen from briefings or even regular
relations with disreputably regimes. 
Another source of evidence which has historically
proven problematic in terrorism cases concerns agents and
informants. Recent examples have included O’Farrell,
Rafferty and McDonald, who were convicted in May 2002
of attempting to acquire weaponry for the Real IRA after
being lured into a meeting in Slovakia with British Security
Service agents, pretending to represent the Iraqi
government ([2005] EWCA Crim 1945, [2005] EWCA
Crim 1970). Next, FBI agent David Rupert was prominent
in the infiltration of the Real IRA in Ireland (Breslin v
McKenna [2005] NIQB 18; DPP v McKevitt [2009] IESC
29). A third example concerns Hermant Lakhani who
attempted to purchase weapons in New Jersey (480 F.3d
171 (2007)). Aside from public revelations of this kind,
several inquiries into the past running of agents in
Northern Ireland have found multiple abuses amounting to
collusion in paramilitary murders (such as in the case of
Raymond McCord Jr). Hopefully, the Regulation of
Investigatory Powers Act 2000 will avoid some of the
excesses of the past, but the absence of independent
oversight for covert human intelligence sources offers little
confidence for this outcome.
Finally, an unwelcome trend is the secrecy of judgments.
Parts of the judgment in R v Khyam were redacted, and
virtually all of the judgment in the acquittal on appeal of
Danny Morrison has been suppressed ([2009] NICA 1).
Despite all these concerns, the criminal prosecution of
terrorists still involves access to an independent and
thorough trial of accusations to a far better degree than any
executive-based disposal. Lord Diplock’s policy of
criminalisation was valid in 1972 and is valid now. That
approach will better secure due process for the suspect and
will attain a more legitimate and convincing result as far as
the public are concerned. Nevertheless, there remains
extra pressure on criminal processes in terrorist cases to be
quick and to produce the “right” result. Each failure to
convict will bring pressures to compromise, as when the
acquittals on the principal charges in Operation Overt
following the first “Liquid Bomb” trial in September 2008
elicited the complaint from Peter Clarke, speaking on
behalf of the police, about the jury failing to sustain
convictions “despite strong evidence”, though he did also
concede that there is “no need for military commissions or
the juryless Diplock courts of Northern Ireland.” Not yet,
pending their retrial. 
Pressures are being felt to migrate to the lowest
common denominator of article 6 demands so as to solve
the prosecutor’s terrorism dilemma – namely, the need for
intervention prior to the point when in a non-terrorist
case there might have been a tipping point between bad
thoughts and bad deeds. The degree of poverty of that
lowest common denominator is set to be explored further
within control orders where there is a system set up
deliberately to exploit the boundaries between civil and
criminal standards. In response, the decision in Re MB and
AF [2007] UKHL 46 secures the importance of article 6 in
executive disposals because the House of Lords refused to
be sidelined by accepting non-justiciability. However, the24
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judgment also creates endemic uncertainty as to the
standards to be observed. The result is Lord Bingham’s
invitation to a dance of the evidential veils, with the Home
Office revealing tantalising flashes of intelligence, and then
running past a judge to see if the amount of evidential flesh
on show has been sufficiently agreeable. This formula
keeps the government lawyers on their toes. It was
important to develop in this way a jurisprudence of
executive measures without convergence to a degree which
makes criminal justice wholly irrelevant. Accordingly, the
judgment does not make control orders unworkable, but it
does provide a substantial disincentive against the
proliferation of control orders. The case of AF (No 3)
[2009] UKHL 28 now clarifies that the lowest common
denominator can never mean no material disclosure
whatever. But there is further work to be done in providing
further impetus towards criminal justice solutions,
especially by applying a time limit to the renewal of control
orders (see Walker, C, “Keeping control of terrorists
without losing control of constitutionalism” (2007) 59
Stanford Law Review 1395). 
The considerable difficulties encountered by US military
commissions and the injunction of President Obama to
find alternatives have encouraged debates about whether
“national security courts” should supplant either military
commissions or normal criminal courts. The drawbacks
are readily evident (see Vladeck, SI, “The case against
national security courts” (2009) 45 Willamette Law Review
505). Problems would remain with intelligence secrecy and
sensitivity. Problems would remain with the precautionary
logic of intervention before traditional triggers for criminal
law have been clearly satisfied. Problems would remain
with the admissibility of coercive interviews. There would
additionally arise the problem of choice of jurisdiction and
discrimination – who would be tried before such courts
and for what? If one reaches the conclusion that normal
criminal courts do not measure up to the enormity of the
multiple difficulties created by notorious offenders, then
internationalisation rather than militarisation seems a
more promising avenue, as has been attempted from
Nuremberg through to Lockerbie.
CONCLUSIONS 
The domestic resurgence after early 2005 of criminal
justice in response to terrorism is a welcome trend.
Nevertheless, the fundamental paradox of proof beyond
doubt in a climate of precautionary logic remains troubling
and encourages a slide towards minimum standards of due
process. Having to some extent developed a jurisprudence
of executive processes and acceptable adaptations within
criminal justice, as outlined in this paper, there remains
other important work to be undertaken. The agenda
includes the performance of the Crown Prosecution
Service Counter Terrorism Division, whose work was in
many respects praised in a report in 2009 by HM Crown
Prosecution Service Inspectorate. Second, the interests of
victims must be more prominent within the institutional
matrix for security through prosecution. Third, and most
ambitious of all, remains the development of a social
intervention tier to the regulatory pyramid of the control
of terrorism. It would require attention not only to
criminal prosecution, not only to executive control or
deportation, but also to a range of social interventions for
those on the threshold of political violence. Some of our
“neighbour terrorists” should face prosecution, but there
should exist a range of other tactics, assessment,
counselling, and assimilation, to achieve a harmonious life
with unruly and sometimes nasty neighbours.
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